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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRoCEss-SEARCH AND Smzmm-UsE IN
STATE CotmTs OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED !I.LEGALLY-Petitioner was convicted
of bookmaking under the anti-gambling laws of California1 by the use of
evidence obtained through unreasonable search and seizure and through disclosures petitioner made when purchasing a federal wagering tax stamp.
While petitioner and his wife were away, police concealed a microphone in
the hall of his home, later moving it to the bedroom and finally to a bed-

1

Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 195-I) §§337a(I), (2), (3), and ( 4).
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room closet. The instrument was connected to a receiver in a neighboring
garage where other officers monitored all conversations for more than a month.
Petitioner exhausted all state remedies in his attempt to have the evidence
so obtained declared inadmissible. On certiorari the United States Supreme
Court held, affirmed, four justices dissenting. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not prevent the use in a state court of evidence acquired illegally. Irvine
11. People of State of California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381 (1954).
The problem presented by the principal case lies in the area between
Wolf 11. Colorado2 and Rochin 11. California,8 and this is the first decision in
which the Supreme Court hru; attempted to reconcile the two cases. In the
Wolf case local police officers entered the private office of a practicing
physician without warrant and seized his records. As a result the physician
was convicted of conspiracy to commit an abortion. The Supreme Court
held that the right of privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment was protected from state action by the Fourteenth Am.endment,4 but that the exclusion of such evidence was not required to effectuate this guarantee. In
the Rochin case three state police officers entered Rochin's house and forced
their way into a bedroom occupied by him and his wife. Rochin put two
capsules which had been lying on a bedside table into his mouth. After an
unsuccessful attempt to extract them by force the officers took him to a hospital where by the use of an emetic solution he was made to vomit the two
capsules which, as determined by subsequent analysis, contained morphine.
He was convicted of possessing a preparation of morphine/; but the Supreme
Court reversed on the ground that the method used by the state police "shocks
the conscience."6 The principal case was more similar to Wolf in that the
officers did not assault petitioner and did not enter his home while he was
there, but counsel for petitioner attempted to persuade the Court that the
conduct of the officers was so shocking that Rochin should apply. 7 Justice
Jackson made it clear in the majority opinion that the principal case differed
from Rochin in that here there had been no assault on the petitioner's person,8
2 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359 (1949). For penetrating analyses of this case, see Allen,
"Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties," 45 ILL. L. RBv. l
(1950); Desky, "Wolf v. Colorado and Unreasonable Search and Seizure in California,"
38 CALIP. L. R.Bv. 498 (1950).
s 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205 (1952). See 37 CoRN. L.Q. 483 (1952); 25 So. CAI..
L. RBv. 357 (1952).
4 The traditional view is that the Fourteenth Amendment does not include all the
guarantees of the first eight amendments, but only those which are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty • • • ," or "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 325, 58 S.Ct. 149
(1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 at 105, 54 S.Ct. 330 (1934). Justices Black
and Douglas have consistently maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the first
eight amendments applicable to the states directly. See the dissent in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 at 68, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
Ii Cal. Health and Safety Code (Deering, 1952) §11,500.
6 Rochin v. California, note 3 supra, at 172.
7 "An effort is made, however, to bring this case under the sway of Rochin v. California." Principal case at 133.
s "That case involved, among other things, an illegal search of the defendant's person.
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although he did admit, "Few police measures have come to our attention that
more flagrantly, delibe:rately, and persistently violated the • . . Fourth Amendment. . . ."9 The majority also summarily disposed of the contention that
the acts of the police constituted wiretapping and thus violated the Federal
Communications Act.10 Perhaps the greatest importance of the case lies in
the dissenting and concurring opinions. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the
majority opinions in both Wolf and Rochin, thought that the principal case
was sufficiently different from Wolf to declare that the state had overstepped
the bounds of decency as they had in Rochin.11 Justice Frankfurter's broad
interpretation of Rochin gives it a significance which is far more extensive than
that of the majority. Justice Black in his dissent expressed the belief that the
disclosures made by petitioner in purchasing a federal gambling tax stamp12
amounted to self-incrimination and so violated the Fifth Amendment as applied
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.13 Wolf was decided by a divided
Court, six to three, 14 while the decision in the instant case rests upon a bare
majority.15 This assumes appreciable importance since Justice Clark wrote a
separate concurring opinion in this case in which he indicated that he adhered
to the doctrine of Wolf only because he believed precedent should be followed. 16
It appears that state law enforcement agencies might do well to use a higher
degree of caution in obtaining evidence, for it is not at all inconceivable that the
tendency of the justices to qualify the Wolf case might lead to its being overruled
in substance if not in form.
Howard N. Thiele, Jr.
But it also presented an element totally lacking here-coercion . • . , applied by physical
assault upon his person to compel submission to the use of a stomach pump. This was the
feature which led to a result in Rochin contrary to that in Wolf." Principal case at 133.
9 Principal case at 132. Justice Jackson, joined by Chief Justice Warren, suggests that
the erring officials be indicted under the Civil Rights Act, 62 Stat. L. 696 (1948), 18
U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §242. Principal case at 137. For a discussion of the effectiveness
of other remedies which petitioner might use, see Desky, 'Wolf v. Colorado and Unreasonable Search and Seizure in California," 38 CALIF. L. REv. 498 (1950).
10 48 Stat. L. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1946) §605. See also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60
S.Ct. 266 (1939).
11 'While there is in the case before us, as there was 'in Rochin, an element of unreasonable search and seizure, what is decisive here, as in Rochin, is additional aggravating
conduct which the Court finds repulsive." Principal case at 144.
12 See 65 Stat. L. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §3285 et seq.
13 By comparison it is well to note that in the Wolf case Justice Black concurred on the
basis that the Fourth Amendment was binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the federal exclusionary rule was only a rule of evidence and not a constitu·
tional right.
14 In the Wolf case Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented on the ground
that exclusion of evidence secured through unreasonable search and seizure was the only
effective way to enforce the right of privacy.
15 Chief Justice Warren and Justices Jackson, Minton, Reed, and Clark formed the
majority, while Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented.
16 "Had I been here in 1949 when Wolf was decided, I would have applied the
doctrine of Weeks v. United States .•• to the states. But the Court refused to do so then,
and it still refuses today. Thus Wolf remains the law and, as such, is entitled to the
respect of this Court's membership.... In light of the 'incredible' activity of the police here,
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it is with great reluctance that I follow Wolf. Perhaps strict adherence to the tenor of
that decision may produce needed converts for its extinction. Thus I merely concur in the
judgment of affirmance." Principal case at 138-139.

